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pretation is inconsistent with the legislative intent as expressed in
the committee report when such report and the words of the amended
section are considered in conjunction. It is apparent that the protection afforded by the amendment includes all people, including businessmen, when the loan is procured for individual or family purposes.
Furthermore, the protection of the section extends to business persons even though a commercial activity may benefit indirectly because
a loan obtained for individual purposes necessarily leaves more funds
for use in commercial activities. The section says "for such business"
indicating that the loan must be directly related to the business.
Therefore, in conclusion, when the committee report and the
amended section are considered together it appears that the protection
of section 14(c)(3) extends to those who are not engaged in commerce,
such as wage earners, retired people, and tenant farmers; to those who
are engaged in business as sole proprietors and partners, including
professional men, or executives of a corporation, but who receive a loan
in their individual capacity. Creditors who have relied on the false
financial statements of these classes of persons, receive the protection
of section 17(a)(2), and their claims are not discharged while claims of
other creditors are. Discharge is completely denied only when a person
engaged in commerce of any sort obtains a loan to enhance his commercial activity.
GARNEcT L. PATrERSON, I1

HOW CAN WIRETAPPING BE UTILIZED
AND CONTROLLED?
The case of People v. Dinan,- from the New York Court of Appeals, is the most recent wiretapping case to reach a state's highest
appellate court. In it, New York has reaffirmed its position that wiretap evidence is admissible in evidence.2 The question presented by
Iii N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689, 229 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1962), cert. denied, 371 US.
877 (1962).
2New
York has a system whereby law enforcement officers can obtain an ex
parte order from a state court, after meeting certain requirements, which permits
them to tap specific telephone lines for a certain period of time. See N.Y. Const.
art. I § 12 (1938) and N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a. The constitutional provision
provides that laws permitting wiretapping may be passed. Section 813-a seeks to
implement this provision. Certain judges may issue an ex parte order for eavesdropping upon oath or affirmation of law enforcement officers above a prescribed
rank. There must be reasonable grounds that evidence of a crime will be obtained.
The person eavesdropped upon must be particularly described and if a telephone
line is involved, the number must be given. The order is not to be effective longer
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the Dinan case was actually reviewed twice by the highest New York
court, once after the trial court had dismissed the indictments because they were based on wiretap evidence,3 and again after the de4
fendants had been convicted.
At the outset, after the defendants had been indicted, the defense
moved for dismissal of the indictments5 on the authority of Benanti v.
United StatesG and the motion was granted. 7 In the Benanti case, the
United States Supreme Court held that wiretapping by state officers,
even when done pursuant to state authorized procedures, is a violation of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act.8 On appeal
than two months, but may be extended. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-b outlines
the circumstances under which an officer can commence eavesdropping without
a court order. N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 738-741 define the crimes of eavesdropping, what
t)pe of eavesdropping is exempt, describe the punishment for violations, and to
whom it applies.
People v. Dinan, 6 N.Y.2d 715, 158 N.E.2d 501, 185 N.Y.S.2d 806 (1959), cert.
denied 361 U.S. 839 (1959).
'People v. Dinan, ii N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689, 229 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1962), cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962).
&Dinan's purpose was to bring the issue of the wiretap evidence before the court
as quickly as possible. The trial court did inspect the minutes, although the prosecution admitted that its case was based on wiretap evidence. See People v. Wagman,
31 Misc. 2d 505, 221 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1961), where a similar motion was
made.
"355 U-S. 96 (1957).
7
People v. Dinan, 15 Misc. 2d 211, 172 N.YS.2d 496 (Westchester County Ct.
1958).
848 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1958). The statute reads as follows:
No person receiving or assisting in receiving, or transmitting, or assisting in transmitting, any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio shall divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning thereof, except through authorized channels of transmission
or reception, to any person, other than the addressee, his agent, or attorney
or to a person employed or authorized to forward such communication to
its destination, or to proper accounting or distributing officers of the various communicating centers over which the communication may be passed,
or to the master of a ship under whom he is serving, or in response to a
subpoena issued by a court of competent jurisdiction, or on demand of other
lawful authority; and no person not being authorized by the sender shall
intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted communication
to any person; and no person not being entitled thereto shall receive or
assist in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio
and use the same or any information therein contained for his own benefit
or for the benefit of another not entitled thereto; and no person having received such intercepted communication or having become acquainted with
the contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part
thereof, knowing that such information was so obtained, shall divulge or
publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
the same or any part thereof, or use the same or any information therein
contained for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled
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from the trial court's ruling, the Supreme Court of New York reversed
and held that Benanti did not change the New York rule of evidence.
The Supreme Court's order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals without opinion. 10
During the trial that followed, -the defendants sought to obtain
a federal court injunction against the use of this evidence. 1 However,
in Poplees v. Gagliardi12 the application was rejected because the plaintiff had waited too long in applying for relief since the status quo
before trial could no longer be maintained.' 3
thereto: Provided, That this section shall not apply to the receiving, divulging, publishing, or utilizing the contents of any radio communication
broadcast, or transmitted by amateurs or others for the use of the general
public, or relating to ships in distress.
"People v. Dinan, 7 App. Div. 2d i19, 181 N.Y.2d 122 (1958).
Pennsylvania also rejected the suggestion that Benanti may have changed the
doctrine set out in Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), namely that states may
form their own rules of evidence on wiretapping evidence. One Voci was convicted
by use of wiretap evidence and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affiirmed. Commonwealth v. Voci, 185 Pa. Super. 563, 138 A.2d 232 (1958). Benanti was handed
down just before this decision. Then the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed.
Commonwealth v. Voci, 393 Pa. 404, 143 A.2d 652 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 885
(1958). Actually the Pennsylvania legislature had changed their rule of evidence by
statute, but it was passed too late to help Voci, said the court. See Pa. Stat. tit.
15 § 2443 (1958).
' 0 People v. Dinan, 6 N.Y.S.2d 715, 158 N.E.2d 5ol, 185 N.Y.S.2d 8o6 (1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 839 (1959).

"Why the defense waited so long to take such action is difficult to understand.
One possible explanation is that the defense believed that the wiretap evidence
would not be linked with the defendants. However, the prosecution produced a
surprise witness at the trial, a former member of the conspiracy, who identified
the voices of the defendants. Thus, the damaging evidence, the recorded telephone
conversations, could be traced to the defendants, and hence the application for a
federal injunction.
32182 F. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 196o).
"Resort to the federal courts for injunctive relief in such cases has been tried
other times with varied success. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S.

117 (1951), is the

leading case and held that federal courts should refuse to intervene in state criminal
proceedings to suppress evidence. In that case the objectionable evidence was obtained through an unlawful search and seizure by state policemen. The Supreme
Court would not enjoin the use of such evidence in the state court. In Voci v.
Storb, 235 F.2d 48 ( 3 d Cir. 1956), Voci sought to enjoin policemen from testifying
in any pending or future action, to enjoin the prosecutor from using any wiretap
evidence, and to suppress all evidence based on wiretaps. In denying relief the court
relied on Stefanelli. Then Voci again tried to enjoin the policemen from testifying
and also to have the tape recording of the tapped telephone conversations turned
over to the court to be destroyed. The district court dismissed the complaint and
held that Voci could not relitigate his right in light of Voci v. Storb. See Voci v.
Farkas, 144 F. Supp. 1o3 (E.D. Pa. 1956).

A preliminary injunction was granted in Burack v. State Liquor Authority,
i6o F. Supp. 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1958). But here the wiretap evidence was being used
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in an administrative proceeding for suspension of a licensc rather than in a criminal
court.
Another series of cases involved one Pugach. He first sued to enjoin the divulgence by witnesses of information gained through wiretapping and also the use
of evidence secured through leads obtained by wiretaps. The district court denied
relief. Pugach v. Sullivan, i8o F. Supp. 66 (S.D.N.Y. ig6o ) . Then a three judge court
granted a stay pending an appeal of the district court's ruling. Pugach v. Dollinger,
275 F.2d 5o3 (2d Cir. 196o ) . This court tried to distinguish Stefanelli. However, on
appeal, the district court's ruling was affirmed and the stay order vacated. Pugach
v. Dollinger, 277 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 196o ) . In this case the court stated that it was
"guided" by Stefanelli. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision in a memorandum
opinion on authority of Stefanelli and Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (196i).
The most recent litigation on this question still is pending before the Supreme
Court as of this writing. In Bolger v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 196o),
the applicant sought to enjoin a detective from testifying at a state criminal trial.
Here the evidence was obtained through an unlawful search and seizure in which the
detective and federal officers had cooperated. The district court granted the injunction, and the second circuit affirmed. Bolger v. Cleary, 293 F. d 368 (2d Cir. 1961).
cert granted, 368 U.S. 984 (1962).
Another similar case is Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), reversing
218 F.2d 237 (ioth Cir. 1954). Here a federal agent obtained evidence through an
illegal search. The evidence was suppressed in federal prosecution, but then the state
prosecuted. The prosecution wanted to have this agent testify and use the evidence
he had seized. But the Supreme Court put the constitutional issues aside and held
that the agent should be enjoined under the supervisory powers of the court over
the federal law enforcement agencies. However, today both the Rea and Bolger
cases might be decided on the basis of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). Since
such evidence is not inadmissible in any court, the injunction applicant has an
adequate law remedy and the application ought to be denied. Moreover, such a
holding in the Bolger case would be in harmony with Stefanelli, a case which the
court has relied upon in almost every other case in this area of the law.
In addition to the injunction, other remedies have been sought but have proved
unsuccessful. An application for habeas corpus was denied in United States ex rel.
Gragiano v. McMann, 275 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 196o), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 854 (1961).
Gragiano's conviction in a state court had been based on wiretap evidence. In
Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 63o (S.D.N.Y. 1961), Pugach applied for a writ of
habeas corpus, a writ of mandamus to force the United States Attorney to prosecute a New York City police office, a county judge, and an assistant district attorney,
a warrant for their arrest and a search warrant. All the applications were denied.
In Williams v. Ball, 294 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1961,) cert denied, 368 U.S. 990 (1962),
the plaintiff's action was for a declaratory judgment that N.Y. Const. art. I § 12
(1938) and and N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a were invalid. (See note 2 supra for the
substance of these provisions). The district court refused to grant a stay of the state
trial or convene a special court to adjudicate the action for lack of a substantial
constitutional issue. Williams v. Ball, 194 F. Supp. 393 (W.D.N.Y. ig6i). In affirming, the second circuit said that even if these provisions were invalid, that fact would
not help the the plaintiff because of Schwartz v. Texas.
A more recent case is Lebowich v. O'Connor, 309 F.2d i11 (2d Cir. 1962), in
which the second circuit affirmed a decision to dismiss a declaratory judgment action
for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The appellant, on
trial in New York, sought a declaratory judgment that the district attorney had
violated his oath of office by tapping the appellant's telephone line. The action
originally was brought to enjoin the use of wiretap evidence at the criminal trial,
but after the Pugach decision was handed down, the prayer for relief was changed to
one for declaratory judgment.
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On appeal from the convictions that followed, the Court of Appeals
reiterated its position with respect to the Benanti case, and rejected
an argument that Mapp v. Ohio1 4 required a change in the New York
rule regarding the admissibility of wiretap evidence. Three dissenting
judges took the view that -the evidence should be excluded for policy
reasons. 15
The United States Supreme Court has held that evidence obtained
by wiretapping is inadmissible in federal courts' 6 although wiretapping
"367 U.S. 643 (1961). This case held that the fourth amendment to the United
States Constitution was applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment
and so evidence obtained in violation of the search and seizure protections of the
fourth amendment is inadmissible in state as well as federal courts because it is
a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
By denying certiorari in Dinan, the Supreme Court, in effect, has declined, for
the present at least, to reconsider Olmstead v. United States, 277 U-S. 438 (1928)
and Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952) in light of Mapp. The argument in
favor of extending Mapp into this field seems to be that both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and section 605 of the Federal Communications Act are intended to protect the right of privacy of the individual. Since
Mapp requires the states to recognize the protections afforded to individuals by
the fourth amendment and since it establishes the rule of inadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment, the same sanctions should
be imposed when section 605 is violated. However, this argument has never prevailed. See Williams v. Ball, 294 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. g6i), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 990
(1962); People v. Dinan, ii N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689, 229 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1962),
cert, denied, 371 U.S. 877 (i962); People v. Wagman, 31 Misc. 2d 505, 221 N.Y.S.2d
866 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 1961); State v. Carbone, 38 N.J. 19, 183 A.2d 1 (1962) (dictum).
The courts faced with this argument have distinguished between search and seizure
and wiretapping-a distinction established in Olmstead. The former violates a
constitutional provision whereas the latter violates a statute only. Moreover, the
exclusionary rule with respect to wire tapping rests upon the supervisory power of
the judiciary. Compare Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937) with 48 Stat.
1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 6o5 (1958). Under Schwartz the states may form their own
rules of evidence with regard to wiretapping, whereas Mapp is explicitly limited
to excluding evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the fourth
amendment. "We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court."
367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
'1The dissenter's argument is that in admitting the evidence a crime is committed at the trial. These three dissenters are not alone among the New York
judiciary. In at least three instances applications for an ex parte order to tap lines
have been denied. See Matter of Interception of Telephone Communications, 9
Misc. 2d 121, 17o N.Y.S.2d 84 (Sup. Ct. 1958); Application for an Order Permitting
the Interception of Telephone Communications of Anonymous, 208 Misc. 69, 136
N.Y.S.2d 612 (Sup. Ct. 1955); In the Matter of an Application for an Order Permitting the Interception of Telephone Communications, 23 Misc. 2d 643, 198 N.Y.S.2d
572 (Ct. Gen. Sess. 196o).

"-Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). See also Nardone v. United
States, 3o8 U.S. 338 (x939), which held tht such evidence was inadmissible and cannot be used for any purposes, and Weiss v. United States, 3o8 U.S. 321 (1939), which
held that intrastate as well as interstate communications are so protected.
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is not a violation of the fourth and fifth amendments to the United
States Constitution.' 7 However, the Court has also held that the
states may form their own rules of evidence on this matter.' s
There is some merit in the policy considerations behind both the
New York and federal positions. The New York view allows law enforcement officers to use wiretapping to prevent and detect crime.19
Even though the provisions of the applicable New York statutes are
20
not complied with, the evidence obtained illegally is still admissible.
Thus, while there is an attempt to protect the New York citizen
against any unreasonable intrusion into his privacy, the more important consideration under this view is the apprehension and conviction of criminals. On the other side, the United States Supreme
Court takes an opposite stand-no wiretapping and wiretap evidence is inadmissible.21 This view takes from federal law enforcement
17

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
See Griffith v. State, 111 So. 2d 282 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959), in which the court
stated, in dictum however, that wiretapping violated sections 12 and 22 of the
Declarations of Rights of the Florida Constitution, and so wiretapping evidence
would be inadmissible. The holding of the case was that listening over a party line,
which the policeman had hooked up himself, was a wire attachment, not a wiretap,
and the evidence was admissible. Accord: Williams v. State, io 9 So. 2d 379 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1959). The Florida wiretapping statute is Fla. Stat. Ann. § 822.10
(Supp. 1962).

New Jersey has also held that listening over an extension or party line is not
a violation of its statute. See State v. Giardina, 27 N.J. 313, 142 A.2d 609 (1958) and
N.J. Rev. Stat. § 2A:I 4 6-1 (1953). Where a policeman picked up a telephone during a
raid on a bookmaking establishment and listened to the conversation, the statute was
not violated. See State v. Carbone, 38 N.J. 19, 183 A.2d 1 (1962). Contra: Tollin v.
State 78 A.2d 8io (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1951).

Maryland requires an ex parte order from a court permitting wiretapping, or
consent of both parties to the telephone call to listen over an extension line. See
Md. Ann. Code Art. 35, § 93 (1957). Where the consent of only one party to the
call was obtained, convictions of statutory rape and attempted abortion based on
the evidence so obtained were reversed. See Robert v. State, 220 Md. 159, 151
A.2d1 737 (1959)Schwaitz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952)nSee N.Y. Const. art I, § 12 (1938) and N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a.
1
People v. Dinan, ii N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689, 229 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1962), cert.

denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962); People v. Variano, 5 N.Y.2d 391, 157 NE.2d 857, 185
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1959)"See Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957); Weiss v. United States, 3o8 U.S.
321 (1939);

Nardone v. United States, 3o8 U.S. 338 (1939);

Nardone v. United

States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). There are also numerous Supreme Court cases
defining what evidence is admissible and what is prohibited by section 605 of the
Federal Communications Act. See Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 1o7 (1957);
On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S.
129 (1942). These cases deal with listening devices such as dictaphones and microphones. Eavesdropping with such electrical devices is not a violation of the federal
statute because in such a situation there is no communication which comes under
the aegis of the statute.
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agencies'a valuable weapon in combating crime. The facts are, however, that neither the Federal Bureau of Investigation nor the several
branches of the armed services feel bound by the prohibition of section 6o5 and have in the past carried on extensive wiretapping operations. 22 It seems that some method should be worked out whereby
law enforcement officers can use wiretapping and yet provide safeguards for privacy of individuals.
Congress -has had before it in the past several bills which would
have permitted wiretapping under certain circumstances. 2 Unfortunately, the various attempts made in Congress in the past to modify the
2-4
prohibition of section 605 have failed ,to gain the necessary support.
Many of these proposals would provide for a procedure similar to that
found in a few states, namely the requirement of an ex parte order
from a judge, after good cause has been shown, authorizing the wire2
tapping. 5
A survey of the efforts of the state legislatures shows that few of
them have appreciated the problem, and only three have enacted legislation whereby the advantages of wiretapping may be utilized by
law enforcement agencies and the rights of individual privacy are, at
26
the same -time, properly protected.
A majority of .the states have some legislation dealing with the
28
subject of wiretapping,2 7 prohibiting it in all but a few instances.
2
See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Wiretapping of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., ist Sess., ser. 2, at 37 (1955). The
then Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Warren Olney, testified that at no time has the
number of wiretaps by the F.B.I. ever exceeded 200 at any one time. He had no
idea what the total for a year might be.
2See H.R. 762, 84th Cong., ist Sess. (1955); H.R. 867, 84 th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1955); H.R. 4513, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R. 4728, 8 4 th Cong., 1st Sess.

(1955); H.R. 5096, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).

2'With the adjournment of the 87 th Congress, all the legislative proposals before
it died. T"he hearings being conducted on wiretapping by a subcommittee of the
House Committee on the Judiciary were adjourned and were not printed for public distribution.
"See H.R. 762, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); H.R. 867, 84 th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955);
H.R. 4513, 84 th Cong., ist Sess. (1955); H.R. 5096, 84 th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
2.These three states are Maryland, Nevada, and Oregon. Their statutes are
discussed in footnotes 33 through 40 infra and the accompanying text.
OAla. Code tit. 14, § 84; tit. 48, § 414 (1958); Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. §
49-5-12, 49-5-19 (1949); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-886 (1956); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 73-1810
(repl. vol. 1957); Cal. Pen. Code §§ 591, 640; C.Z. Code tit. 5,§ 853 (1934) (telegrams
only); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-17 (1953); Con. Gen. Stat. Rev. § 53-140 (1958);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 757 (1953); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 822.10 (Supp. 1962); Ga. Code
Ann. § 26-3805 (Supp. 1961); § 26-8114 (1953); Hawaii Rev. Laws § 296-14 (1955), §
39OA-1 (Supp. 196o); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-6705 (1947); II. Ann. Stat. ch. 134,
§ 15a (Smith-Hurd 1936); Iowa Code § 716.8 (1962); Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-1908
(1949); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 433430 (1955); La. Rev. Stat. § 14.322 (195o); Md. Ann.
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Yet many of these statutes are aimed at protecting the facilities of the
public utilities rather than the privacy of the individual. 29 In any
event, few convictions are based upon them. 30 Some of these statutes
Code art. 35, § 93, art. 27, § 585 (1957); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 99 (Supp. 1961);
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.808 (1954); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 94-35-220 (1947) (telegrams
only); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-328 (1943); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 2oo.620, 200.640,
707.100, 707.320 (1957); NJ. Rev. Stat. § 2A:1 4 6-1 (1953); N.M. Stat. Ann. §
40-37-5 (1953); N.Y. Pen. Laws § 738; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-158 (1953); N.D. Cent.
Code Ann. § 8-10-07 (1961); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4931.28 (Baldwin 1958); Okla.
Stat. tit. 21, § 1757 (1951); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 164.620, 165.510 (telegrams only), 165.540
(1953); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit 15, § 2443 (1958); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. §§ 11-35-11 (telegrams only), 11-35-12 (1956); S.C. Code 16-554, 58-316 (1952); S.D. Code § 134519
(1939); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-4533, 65-2117 (1956); Utah Code Ann. § 76-48-11
(1953); Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-156 (repl. vol. 196o); W. Va. Code Ann. § 5970 (1961);
Wis. Stat. § 134.29 (1961); Vyo. Stat. § 37-259 (1957). See also P.R. Const. art. II,
§ lo, for a unique constitutional provision specifically prohibiting wiretapping. See
also N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 572.3 (1955) and State v. Tracy, ioo N.H. 267, 125 A.2d
774 (195 6 ), which held that the statute was not construable as regulating or prohibiting wiretapping. In addition to New Hampshire, the following states have no
apparent legislation dealing with wiretapping: Indiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Texas, Vermont, and Washington. The District of Columbia is covered by section 6o5 of the Federal Communications Act. See United States v.
Plisco, 22 F. Supp. 242 (D.D.C. 1938).
2nThe most common exception to the prohibition is the normal operation of
the public utility. See Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 49-5-12 (1949); Hawaii Rev. Laws
§ 3o9A-1 (Supp. 196o); Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 93 (1957); Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
272, § 102 (Supp. 1961); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 200.620, 707.100 (1957); N.Y. Pen.
Law § 739; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-155 (1953); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 165.510, 165.540
(19 5 3 );R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-35-12 (1956). The consent of one or both of the
parties of the conversation is another exception. See Hawaii Rev. Laws § 3o 9 A-1
(Supp. 196o); Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 93 (957); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 99
(Supp. 1961); N.Y. Pen. Law § 738; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-155 (1953); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 165.540 (1953); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2443 (1958). Two states have exempted
their law enforcement officers from the prohibitions of their statutes. See La. Rev.
Stat. § 14.322 (195o) and S.C. Code § 16-554 (1952). The most significant exception is
where a court has issued an ex parte order permitting wiretapping. See Md. Ann.
Code art. 35, § 93 (1957); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 99 (Supp. ig6i); Nev. Rev.
Stat. § 200.630 (1957); N.Y. Pen. Law § 739; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 165.540 (1953).
nMany of the statutes are placed in the public utilities sections of the codes
rather than the criminal law section. Moreover, many of them cover a great deal
more than tapping wires. These are protection of property statutes, not protection
of privacy statutes. See Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 49-5-12 (1949); Cal. Pen. Code
§ 591; Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-4-17 (1953); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 822.10 (Supp. 1962);
Hawaii Rev. Laws § 296-14 (1955); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-6705 (1947); I1. Ann.
Stat. ch. 134, § 15a (Smith-Hurd 1936); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 433430 (1955);
Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28-808 (1954); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 86-328 (1943); N.M. Stat. Ann.
§ 40-37-5 (1953); N.D. Cent Code § 8-10-07 (1961); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4931.28
(Baldwin 1958); Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1757 (1951); S.D. Code § 134519 (1939); Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 39-4533, 65-2117 (1956); Va. Code Ann. § 18.1-156 (repl. vol. 196o);
Wyo. Stat. § 37-259 (1957).
3'People v. Broady, 5 N.Y.2d 5oo, 158 N.E.2d 837, 186 N.Y.S.2d 23o (1959). The
defendant in that case was a private detective. See also Hearings Before the Subcommittee on the Study of Wiretapping of the House Committee on the Judiciary,
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give a civil remedy, but the criminal liability is the only deterrent
relied upon in a majority of the states. 3' As yet, only Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, and Wisconsin have enacted legislation which makes
all wiretap evidence inadmissible.
Five states-Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, and Oregon, have legislation enabling a law enforcement officer to obtain an
ex parte order from a court to permit wiretapping. 33 It is submitted
that the best of these five acts is that of Maryland. 34 It would appear
to be superior to the statutes of New York and Massachusetts in that
it makes evidence obtained in any manner other than that prescribed
inadmissible. 35 Neither New York nor Massachusetts has this protection for an individual's privacy. The reason for preferring the
Maryland legislation over the similar acts of Oregon and Nevada
is that it clearly sets forth the public policy of the state, 36 which the
others fail to do. All the acts of the five states listed above describe
under what circumstances communications may be intercepted. There
84 th Cong., ist Sess., ser. 2 at 36-37 (1955). The Justice Department could supply
the Subcommittee with records of only three convictions of section 6o of the Federal
Communications Act. See also United States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 86o (2d Cir. 1957)
in which the defendant was convicted of violating section 6o5. For the criminal
penalties imposed for conviction of a violation of section 6o5, see 48 Stat. l1OO
(934), as amended 68 Stat. 30 (1954), 47 U.S.C. § 501 (1958).
'For statutes giving a civil remedy see: Alaska Comp. Laws Ann. § 49-5-19
(1949) (liability to the company or persons injured); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 707.14o
(1957) (liability to person damaged); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 30.78o, 165.510 (1953)
(liability for damages, probably to the person injured and not the company); Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2443 (1958) (liability to person whose communication is inter.
cepted). Civil relief is also available to some extent in the federal courts, although
no federal legislation expressly creates civil liability for wiretapping. See Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947). But the doctrine of that case
was not extended to cover a quasi-judicial officer. See Simons v. O'Connor, 187
F. Supp. 702 (S.D.N.Y. 196o), in which an action for damages, brought against a
district attorney for wiretapping, was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.
3Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2443 (1958); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 11-35-13 (1956);
Wis. Stat. § 325.36 (g6i). These are the only states which have established a rule
through legislation, which is substantially the same as the Supreme Court's, as
first enunciated in the Nardone cases.
"See Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 94 (Supp. 1962); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 99
(Supp. 1961); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 2oo.66o (1957); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a; Ore.
Rev. Stat. § 141.720 (1953)
"Actually there is little to choose from among the acts of Maryland, Nevada,
and Oregon
-"See Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 97 (1957); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 2oo.68o (1957); and
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 41.910 (1953). These statutes specifically state that evidence obtained
by wiretapping without a court order is inadmissible. The Massachusetts and New
York statutes do not formulate any rule on this matter, and no case has come to
light which covers the situation.
NSee Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 92 (1957).
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must be a showing that a crime has been committed or is about to be
committed, and -that evidence will be obtained that will probably result in the solution or prevention of the crime.37 In Maryland, Nevada,
and Oregon, the applicant must demonstrate further that no other
means are available to obtain the information.3 8 Thus in those states,
wiretapping cannot be used simply because it is an effective way to
gain otherwise difficult to obtain information, but only as a last resort
when all else fails. All five of the above mentioned states require an
ex parte order for use of other electrical devices for eavesdropping on
conversations.39 Again the requirements in New York and Massachu40
setts for obtaining such an order are somewhat less stringent.
This scheme of legislation, enacted in Maryland, Nevada, and Oregon, is superior to any other thus far enacted or proposed. It combines the destruction .to property, wiretapping, and eavesdropping
features of the other types of statutes, and is thus broader in scope
than the federal legislation now in force. There are no apparent loopholes for over-zealous law enforcement officers, as many of the proposed
Congressional bills have had. Nor does this legislation permit shortcuts in crime detection and prevention-the applicant must show that
no other means of obtaining the information is available. The right of
privacy is protected against any unreasonable interception of communications, and yet the law enforcement agencies are not prohibited nor
unduly hindered from employing this very useful and effective means
of crime prevention and detection. It is hoped that other states and
Congress, following the lead of Maryland, Nevada, and Oregon, will
'See Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 94 (Supp. 1962); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 99
(Supp. 1961); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.66o (1957); N.Y.Code Crim. Proc. §§ 813-a;
813-b; Ore Rev. Stat. § 141.720 (1953).
'¢Md. Ann. Code art. 35, § 94 (Supp. 1962); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200,660 (1957);
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 141.720 (1953).
MMd. Ann. Code art. 27, §§ 125A, 125 B, 125C, (Supp. 1962); Mass. Ann. Laws
ch. 272, § 99 (Supp. 1961); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 20o.650 (1957); N.Y. Pen. Law § 738;
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 165.54o (1953). There is no federal legislation covering this situation. See Rathbun v. United States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957); On Lee v. United States,
343 U.S. 747 (1952); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942). The holding of
these cases was to limit the scope of section 605 of the Federal Communications
Act so that it does not prohibit the use of these electrical devices.
'The requirements in all of these five states are the same as for an order to
permit wiretapping. Therefore New York and Massachusetts do not require a
showing that no other means is readily available. See Md. Ann. Code art. 27, §
125 A (Supp. 1962); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 272, § 99 (Supp. 1961); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 2oo.66o (1957); N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. §§ 813-a, 813-b; Ore. Rev. Stat. § 141.720
(1953).

